VoIPshield announces discovery of “over 100 vulnerabilities” in Cisco, Avaya, Nortel VoIP systems

voipshield.jpgSo today VoIPshield Laboratories announced the discovery of over 100 security vulnerabilities in systems from Avaya, Cisco and Nortel and, somewhat predictably, this has already resulted in coverage from the Wall Street Journal BizTech blog and InfoWorld’s Security Watch blog. I will expect to see more coverage in the days ahead as it works its way out into the mainstream media. The news release is a good one and includes great quotes from Gartner’s Lawrence Orans and our (VOIPSA) own Jonathan Zar.

VoIPshield has disclosed all the vulnerabilities to the vendors and has made 44 of the vulnerabilities available at www.voipshield.com/research (That is the number I currently see on the page.)

I should note that VoIPshield Systems, under whom VoIPshield Laboratories falls, is a member of the VOIPSA Technical Board of Advisors. I also have met the VoIPshield folks several times and Jonathan and I interviewed CTO Bogdan Materna eons ago back on Blue Box podcast #12. We’ve been on panels together and I have a high degree of respect for what they are doing and how they are doing it.

This familiarity, though, does not prevent me from feeling a bit uneasy about two aspects of this announcement today. First, if you look down the list of vulnerabilities in almost all cases (41 of 44) the vendor response state is “Attempting to address the issue“.

In other words, these are current, open vulnerabilities. No patches. No fixes. (Outside of the stated recommendation to follow network security best practices and potentially to purchase a VoIP security product such as the one VoIPshield makes.)

Now in many cases the vulnerability announcements are sufficiently vague that an attacker is not going to be able to do a whole lot with them. However, in other cases, there’s enough information there to point the way for an attacker. For instance, this one for Cisco for “UCM Multiple Hardcoded Passwords” indicates:


By knowing and using the hardcoded account names and passwords (a total of three have been identified) on the UCM platform, an attacker can connect to the system and issue database commands which can result in code execution, denial of service, license exhaustion or theft, etc.

So now we know there are three account names (at least) with default passwords that can be used to administer a Cisco UCM system. How long will it be now before someone sitting there with a brute-force password script will figure out those names and post them to one of the various default password lists out there?

Now, this particular vulnerability announcement does state:

Cisco acknowledges the presence of these hardcoded passwords and is working to have the values set to an administrator definined setting during installation.

This will undoubtedly involve a new release of the software (since it refers to the installation process). That will take some time, obviously, and in the meantime any Cisco Unified Communications Manager installations out there are potentially vulnerable to abuse through these hardcoded usernames and passwords.

I understand that VoIPshield did contact these vendors and at least per the WSJ article gave them at least 30 days notice. I also realize that vendors may not always be able to create quick solutions and also may not assign the same priority to issues (or may in fact dispute/dismiss the issue). Having been on the vendor side, I well understand the dynamics of working with security research firms. I know there can be challenges on both sides. Still, I personally would have been a lot more comfortable with seeing this information out there if they had waited a bit until more than just 3 of the 44 listed vulnerabilities have vendor patches available.

Which brings me to my second concern. The vulnerability notices posted do not include any “mitigating circumstances”. They state the description of the problem and offer the recommendation to use network security best practices and VoIP security products such as those sold by VoIPshield, but they do not provide a sense of how to evaluate the risk involved. For instance, with the hardcoded passwords, I am assuming the attacker needs to be on the internal network, but is that correct to assume? With the DFR Cancel Backup Command Injection vulnerability, does the attacker need to be on the internal network? Or could they be on the public Internet? (if systems traversed the Internet)

Now perhaps VoIPshield is waiting to provide this type of information until there is a fix out there. This is also their first time issuing public vulnerability notices in this form. Perhaps with feedback such as this they will provide that added information. But without that kind of information, it’s not clear to me that I have enough information to understand the potential risk to my systems. (And perhaps we’ll have to have them on a podcast to talk about all of this.)

Regardless of these two concerns, the fact remains that VoIPshield Laboratories has entered the space as a new research entity and has already brought out a wealth of research. Per their news release, this is just the first step and more information will be coming soon. That all is good to hear as having such research groups focusing on the VoIP security space is a definite good thing. We need more research in the field and so it’s great to see VoIPshield entering the space publicly. (They’ve obviously been doing this research privately for their products for some time.)

And, if you are the administrator of a system from Avaya, Cisco or Nortel, I would strongly encourage you to review the vulnerabilities and try to understand which of them may or may not affect your installations.

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