[VOIPSEC] Anyone aware of public disclosures of security incidents related to SIP trunks?

[ed guy]

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On 12/22/09 6:09 AM, J. Oquendo wrote:
>
>> DY> Right.  An attacker could potentially spoof the IP and trigger
> many SIP INVITES, but would not be able to receive the return traffic
> and launch the actual call.
>
Dan,

This threat is one of the reasons why sip identity (rfc 4474) is
available for asterisk
and openser/kamilio.   With the right configuration, it allows you set
control access
without significantly impacting Post Dial Delay.   e.g., after the
identity is authenticated,
one can make admittance decisions based on the identity or signer.

/ed

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