[VOIPSEC] Watering down VoIP security expectations.

Simon Horne s.horne at packetizer.com
Thu Mar 9 19:42:46 CST 2006


Guys

This is my little rant about a disturbing trend on VoIP security I am 
seeing on this list and in the press in general. The language has changed 
from "how do we fix" to "how do we live with", which, i don't know about 
other people, just does not cut it. IMHO we should be looking for solutions 
for VoIP Security and answers like "oh that's only a problem IF..." and "IF 
you don't..." are not answers but compromises. People want ANSWERS and 
SOLUTIONS, not compromises. VoIP is suppose to be, according to all the 
press, the next great thing but if you can't we fix the simple things....

I was gob smacked to read people pushing the virtues of using a VPN to 
provide VoIP security. VPN?. That's what cavemen were using in the VoIP 
dinosaur age. Have we not EVOLVED?. I understand the reasoning for 
suggesting it because it's probably one of the only solutions that ACTUALLY 
works with different products from different vendors (as discussed SRTP is 
not widely deployed and vendors that do offer it, can't talk to eachother). 
So what the heck have we been doing for the last few years? (ok some work 
has been done, but these solutions are vendor specific and require 
infrastructure upgrades and may not be backward compatible etc etc...)

Recently someone asked "So what's new in dealing with NAT?" and the answer 
"Get an SBC" and then there was a competition of which vendor had the best 
SBC. That's not an answer, people have been using SBC's (when they were 
called proxies) for NAT Traversal for 10 years, we've seen solutions such 
as STUN (useless for symmetric NAT) and ICE (go get a coffee while we wait 
for the call to connect) so the only real workable "catch all" solution is 
still "Get a proxy!". What the heck have we been doing for 10 YEARS?

When I first joined the list back in the early days, there was some 
discussion on SPIT and the tone was "how do we kill it". Which, at the 
time, I discussed at length with a college of mine in the open source 
community about how we could go about "killing it" and we both agreed the 
solution was actually quite simple. "Put an authentication component in the 
first call setup message to identify the caller." If the caller has it and 
authenticates than accept the call. If it doesn't then reject the call. 
Fairly simple? In reality, this is extremely difficult to do in SIP, 
basically because there is no dedicated end-to-end call signalling channel 
which means the two parties cannot easly identify themselves but have to 
rely on intermediaries and use ideas like SIP identity which puts some 
limitation on its usefulness. So the common consensus now is that its too 
hard to fix so lets "manage" the problem. Like Email and SPAM? OMG! We need 
a SOLUTION.....!!

In someways, I think the VoIP (and security especially) industry, aside 
from the hype, is actually devolving (going backwards) and settling for 
solutions just years before we would of thought as "not good enough". I 
think there needs to be a wholesale review on WTF are we doing and where 
are we going because it seem to me that there is a "kinda maybe" solution 
for this and a "kinda maybe" solution for that and no wholistic approach to 
the security issue. Maybe we do need to go "back to school" on VoIP 
security and reassess the protocols and (re)incorporate new ideas (backward 
interoperable if possible) and not take an after thought "I got this cool 
VoIP phone now how do I secure it" approach which we have today.

I do very much commend Richard Paine's recent post, now that is forward 
thinking, looking at security as not just about securing media by method A 
and signalling by method B but a wholistic approach and how each of those 
security elements fit within an overall security framework. Hey this stuff 
may not be "sexy" and not the "in" thing and maybe not even the flavor of 
the month but it is extremely important and when it comes to the crunch and 
the customer says "Give me secure VoIP" they don't want excuses, they don't 
care what color or flavor it is, all they want is for something to JUST WORK!


Simon










More information about the Voipsec mailing list