[VOIPSEC] RTP packet signature

[Hadriel Kaplan]

I am definitely not an encryption-layer guy (which is why I asked on this
list).  I was just curious given how much of the plaintext and keygen values
can be known, whether known-plaintext attack was a reasonable attack vector.
(e.g., given all the press over the XSL attack theory on AES)  But one of
the encryption guys at my company pointed me to some papers and discussions
on it and I'm convinced it's still highly impractical.  

As to whether 8KB of codec plaintext (500 AES blocks) is enough for even a
simple brute force known plaintext attack to be theoretically possible I
have no idea, but I believe it would be practically impossible anyway.

-hadriel


-----Original Message-----
From: Voipsec-bounces at voipsa.org [mailto:Voipsec-bounces at voipsa.org] On
Behalf Of Pankaj Shroff
Sent: Wednesday, October 12, 2005 3:59 PM
To: Cesc Santasusana
Cc: Voipsec at voipsa.org; HKaplan at acmepacket.com
Subject: Re: [VOIPSEC] RTP packet signature

 Wouldn't the ciphertext block size have to be significantly large for the
"silence" packets for the hacker to come close to breaking the code?
 Pankaj
 --
Pankaj Shroff
shroffg at gmail.com
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