[VOIPSEC] Cisco 7920 wireless IP Phones

Robert Moskowitz rgm at icsalabs.com
Tue May 31 14:26:22 BST 2005


At 08:13 AM 5/27/2005, Savage, John C (John) wrote:
>Or just stick with wired phones for the time being.  Wireless is nice, but
>largely a matter of convenience in most cases where you wouldn't have to
>move away from 802.x anyway.

um.  if by 802.x you mean all IEEE p802 media, that includes wireless!!! 
(.11, .15, .16, .20, and .22!  Yes p802 is VERY busy with wireless!)

You should stick with 802.3.  That is the only wired media you will tend to 
find for end systems anymore.  Token ring and FDDI seem to have faded away 
and 802.17 is for MANs.

:)



>-----Original Message-----
>From: David Elbel [mailto:david.elbel at gmail.com]
>Sent: Thursday, May 26, 2005 4:54 PM
>To: Voipsec at voipsa.org
>Subject: Re: [VOIPSEC] Cisco 7920 wireless IP Phones
>
>
>I think everyone is forgetting that there is no VOIP protocol that will work
>
>over TLS, SSL, or SSH. I have yet to have figured out how to use SSL or SSH
>over UDP.
>
>Also I seriously doubt the cisco wireless phone supports WPA2-2AES.
>
>If the military really needs crypto on the wireless phones, my guess would
>be that they should negotiate with the vendor for a custom ROM that supports
>
>this (layer 7 or layer 4 OSI) . The design problem is What end-to-end link
>will be encrypted? Call them and ask; they might already have something
>available for testing. Somebody from Cisco might be on this list who might
>know. Regardless, the market will demand it soon.
>
>
>
>On 5/26/05, Porter, Thomas (Tom) <tporter at avaya.com> wrote:
> >
> > Chris,
> >
> > The point I am making is that wireless networks can be made as secure or
> > more secure (since typically, LAN traffic is not encrypted) than wired
> > networks. I think that most people would agree with this. Certainly WEP
> > & LEAP are not sufficient to protect these networks, but other IETF
> > standard forms of EAP (TLS/PEAP, TTLS, etc) & their implementations are.
> > 802.11i (AES-CCM) rely upon digital certs & are not subject to
> > person-in-the-middle attacks. Yes, SSL & SSH *can* be hijacked, but if
> > implemented properly they *cannot* be. This is not meant as an offense
> > to you & Don Bailey, but the fact is: Many wireless, SSH, and SSL
> > implementations (not sure why you included these w/ wireless) can be &
> > are more secure than the corresponding wired networks. Head-on attacks
> > against these implementations are destined to fail - of course, no
> > amount of encryption, etc can protect against a single weak password,
> > but that is a separate issue.
> >
> > Best, Tom
> >
> > TLS is SSL all grown up.
> >
> > "SSL and SSH can be hijacked (MiM, Man in the middle) by hacker tools
> > crafted specifically for VoIP. A good example of ssl hijacking is a tool
> > called airsnarf.
> > http://airsnarf.shmoo.com/ I believe that this would be a trivial task
> > to convert to SIP since it is merely a cousin to html."
> >
> > The author, Beetle, gave some very good demonstrations of how easy it is
> > to break "ANY" wireless encryption/protection scheme and, with this
> > tool, hijack any ssl/tls encrypted page to capture authentication/credit
> > card or any other info that was supposed to be encrypted. Over two days
> > he was able to show a class of about 60 people, many new to wireless how
> > to do the same thing.
> >
> > When I say that IPSec adds too much overhead I refer to the fact that,
> > due to encapsulation, IPSec adds approximately 40% additional overhead
> > to an IP packet and often fragmentation due to packets that need to be
> > fragmented for encapsulation.
> >
> > Chris
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Robert Thompson Jr. [mailto:rthompson at columbiabank.com]
> > Sent: Wednesday, May 25, 2005 1:19 PM
> > To: Chris at infravast.com; Voipsec at voipsa.org
> > Subject: RE: [VOIPSEC] Cisco 7920 wireless IP Phones
> >
> > I am very new to VOIP, so please bear with me.
> >
> > But when you say that it is trivial to intercept the traffic, you just
> > mean to receive it right? You are not talking about deciphering the
> > information and being able to listen in on the conversation are you?
> >
> > Why would IPSEC add too much overhead?
> >
> > Instead of SSH and SSL, could TLS be used? As I am under the
> > understanding that TLS doesn't have any more overhead than SSL though is
> > quite more secure.
> >
> > Rob.
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Voipsec-bounces at voipsa.org [mailto:Voipsec-bounces at voipsa.org] On
> > Behalf Of Christopher A. Martin
> > Sent: Tuesday, May 24, 2005 5:47 PM
> > To: 'Finnegan, James M SAM Contractor'; Voipsec at voipsa.org
> > Subject: RE: [VOIPSEC] Cisco 7920 wireless IP Phones
> >
> >
> > It is trivial to hijack, intercept, impersonate any type of traffic over
> > wireless, whether WEP, WAP, etc is implemented. IPSec over it is about
> > the only safe bet (which adds too much overhead). SSH and SSL can also
> > be compromised due to wireless hijacking.
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Voipsec-bounces at voipsa.org [mailto:Voipsec-bounces at voipsa.org] On
> > Behalf Of Finnegan, James M SAM Contractor
> > Sent: Tuesday, May 24, 2005 12:03 PM
> > To: Voipsec at voipsa.org
> > Subject: [VOIPSEC] Cisco 7920 wireless IP Phones
> >
> > Greetings all,
> >
> > I have run into a problem I was hoping to get feedback on. We are
> > using the 7920 IP Phones at our sites, running CCM 3.3.
> >
> > The Army has decided the wireless link needs to be encrypted with
> > something other than WEP or WEP w/LEAP. Our standard wireless
> > encryption is 3DES.
> > The
> > 7920's only support WEP or WEP w/LEAP. Has anyone run into this problem?
> >
> >
> >
> > Thanks
> >
> >
> >
> > Mike Finnegan
> >
> > B.I.T.S.
> >
> > U.S.Army Corp of Engineers
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
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> >
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Robert Moskowitz
Senior Technical Director
ICSA Labs, a division of Cybertrust, Inc.
W:      248-968-9809
F:      248-968-2824
VoIP:   248-291-0713
E:      rgm at icsalabs.com

There's no limit to what can be accomplished if it doesn't matter who gets 
the credit





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