[VOIPSEC] VoIP and Banking Security

[Christopher A. Martin]

A Trojan crafted to cause a UAC to transmit and split traffic in the
clear (for the split traffic) and SRTP to the legitimate receiver might
be a plausible attack. Doesn't require a sniffer either.

Chris 

-----Original Message-----
From: Voipsec-bounces at voipsa.org [mailto:Voipsec-bounces at voipsa.org] On
Behalf Of Michael Stauffer
Sent: 06/23/2005 6:33 AM
To: Voipsec at voipsa.org
Subject: [VOIPSEC] VoIP and Banking Security

Al,

Is being able to sniff DTMF Digits not in line with your wishes?  :)

Looks like a RFC 2833 dissector to me, available in Ethereal.  
So can anyone sniff these packets?  Well, in a properly configured,
switched environment, it's not something that's done without effort, but
a malicious agent with sufficient motivation and skill can capture
these, yes.  (The previous discussions from this list on the relative
ease of capturing in a switched environment acknowledged).  I could be
wrong, but I believe SRTP would take care of this.  Thoughts?

Mike Stauffer
BAH
VoIP Security 









Greetings,

New here, and yes, I did check the archives first.

I just finished a session with my bank using the touch pad on my phone.
When finished I dumped the packets captured during the transaction
(using
ethereal).  I was a little dismayed and a lot alarmed to see wherever
the
protocol was RTP EVE that the numbers I pressed on the phone were
visible in
the info field:

     Payload type=RTP Event, DTMF Eight 8

I'm guessing that if I can sniff these packets, so can anyone else.

Anyone have any comments to calm my nerves?

Thanks,

Al


_______________________________________________
Voipsec mailing list
Voipsec at voipsa.org
http://voipsa.org/mailman/listinfo/voipsec_voipsa.org