Voice of VOIPSA

I’m sorry to say so
But, sadly it’s true
That bang-ups and hang-ups
Can happen to you

– Dr. Seuss, "Oh, the places you’ll go!" (1990)

Back in January 2010, I wrote a short blog post about Shodan and VoIP devices and mentioned that it’s a site well worth revisiting.  Well, that time has come, and there’s plenty more to talk about when it comes to Shodan.

What is Shodan?

It is a publicly available, searchable database of pre-scanned networked devices.  The scanning includes banner results from common services like telnet and http, and is akin to fingerprinting.  One way to look at it is like Rainbow Tables for networked devices.

What’s the risk?

When a new vulnerability is discovered, Shodan makes it easy for attackers to search for vulnerable devices without actively scanning.  For example, say a vulnerability is published about Apache Mod_Security — an attacker can easily search Shodan for vulnerable version and then launch an attack to pwn the box.

Attackers can also use Shodan search filters and really narrow down search results, by country code or CIDR netblock for example.  You do have to register for more specific search functionality if you’re interested in say, the 24 Cisco boxes in Iran with no authentication.

Pssst….wanna Pwn 7000 Cisco routers/switches?

Yes you can.  And only because some network admin didn’t know how to configure HTTP authentication.  It’s easy peasy with Shodan’s most popular search.  Click on the resulting IP addresses from that search and you’ll get the HTTP interface of a Cisco router/switch with no authentication.  Add "/level/15/exec/-/sh/run/CR" to the IP address and you’ll get the "show running configuration" output of the device.  Understand what’s going on here.  An attacker can easily add an admin-level account, change the configuration, crack the listed Cisco passwords in the configuration to target other devices on that network, etc. 

Why should I care?

Shodan creates risk by making poor configurations and other adminstrator mistakes much more visible to potential attackers.  It also creates risk by providing a pre-scanned inventory of potential targets.  I’ve seen some amazingly frightning devices discovered through Shodan that are wide open and have no authentication — for a few examples:

• An Eastern European country’s SCADA water treatment network
• A switch controlling the Neurosurgery VLANs of a hospital
• Physical security door access controller systems
• Routers with VoIP configurations
• and plenty more….

These are just a few examples of the micro-risks.  I think from a macro-risk perspective, specifically concerning the Cisco routers with no authentication, is the very possible and easy mass takeover of routers and potential for BGP attacks.  Not possible?  Well, think back to early 2008 when Pakistan modified BGP routes to block YouTube and because of a misconfiguration, large swaths of the Internet outside of Pakistan could not access the site. This was the result of a error from a few routers broadcasting bad BGP routes — now imagine if an attacker does this with a few thousand routers distributed globally?  I think it’s really only a matter of time…

What should I do?

There are tangible steps you can take.  First and foremost if to register fora free Shodan account and search for devices on your organization’s CIDR netblock.  If you are working with buisness partners that are connected to you, check their CIDR netblocks in Shodan as well.  Make a stink and inform the right network and security people of the risks of Shodan exposure.

Or

You can do nothing, and let Shodan determine your fate.  Your choice.

• Ensure that student’, and their parents, are made aware of the issues and risks of not having a landline, as well as the benefits

• Prioritize cellular e911 location tracking on college campuses

• Require residents with disabilities to have a landline

• Provide residence hall staff with resident’s cellular numbers

• Provide a privacy booth for landline phones placed in common areas to enable students to make calls with some level of privacy and caller-id blocking

In the 80s movie “The Color of Money” there’s a great scene where a player challenges Tom Cruise’s character to a game. He strolls up to Vincent and says “So what you got in there?” — to which Vincent replies. “Doom.”

This is akin to how I felt a few weeks ago after I finally got ahold of a Nokia N900 smartphone. Calling it a phone is a bit of a stretch, as it is primarily a Debian Linux tablet with impressive hardware specs and a huge number of .deb packages available for installation…oh, and you can make cellular phone calls with it. Many people use this phone, and despite some glitches it is rapidly developing into a formidable platform for security tools and penetration testing.

Broadly speaking, the objective of this series of blog posts is to introduce folks to the tools available and the potential for this phone as a security testing platform. Given the fact I’m a bit late in obtaining this phone, some smart people out there have already started to address the n900′s capabilities and available tools, and I would be remiss not to mention, and build upon, their insightful work. The key phrase here is “build upon” and get the word out, not to steal or simply re-hash their fine work and efforts!

I’ve one caveat to this series of blog posts. As my n900 is for now a “production phone” for me in that I need to use it and can’t brick it just yet, the path of this blog series on “Weaponizing the Nokia N900″ will progress from known, tested and functioning security tools on this phone — and therefore lower risk of bricking — to more advanced, edgy tools that require more tweaks and modifications, such as replacing the stock kernel. If someone out there finds this series useful, and has interest in furthering research on running security tools on the n900, I’d welcome the donation of a n900 for development and testing, and would credit them for their support. Please ping me offline if you’re interested

NeoPwn and the Nokia N900

One project to watch in particular is the upcoming release of NeoPwn, which is based on BackTrack and bills itself as the “First Ever Network Auditing Distribution for a Mobile Phone Platform” and is due for release sometime this month, hopefully before DefCon. I am fortunate to be in the BETA and will write up a blog post for this series on NeoPwn once I get full access to the NeoPwn toolset.

Worthy Resources on Nokia n900 Security Tools

1. Metasploit on the Nokia n900. ‘Nuff said.

2. knownokia.ca Blog SimonLR wrote an excellent post on “Using the N900 for Fun and Profit” that covers several awesome tools, such as Metasploit, Dsniff, SSLstrip, Aircrack-NG, etc. He’s clearly savvy and his future blogging on tools for the n900 will be great to see.

3. Asterisk on the n900

When I added the extra package repositories to my n900, I was more than a bit surprised to see a full version of Asterisk available as a .deb package. Wow. Think about this for a moment. One can run a full Asterisk server on a phone in their pocket. The capability of Asterisk on the n900 could enable attackers to do all sorts of mischief, such as running the SPITTER tool from their pocket as a simple example. From a surveillance aspect, think of “bad people” with n900s in their pockets running Asterisk servers on their phones and connecting to each other point-to-point over encrypted tunnels — now that’s a challenge.

Stay tuned for more posts on “Weaponizing the Nokia N900″

I don’t travel nearly as as much as I used to, yet when I do I always keep a sharp eye out for the technical glitches in devices around me in travel environments. What can I say? It provides me endless amusement.

While Linux boxes crashing in airlines’ on-board entertainment systems are nothing new, and several photos exist on the Internet depicting these crashes, I’m seeing something different these days…

On my way back from ph-neutral security conference in Berlin, I took a Continental 757 back to the US and observed the passenger entertainment system headrest in the row in front of me was frozen on the the movie selection GUI. The passenger in that seat asked the flight attendant to fix the problem and the headrest PC was rebooted from somewhere up front.

So, the funny (and a bit scary perhaps) bit is the screenshot I took of the reboot process. You can see the very high resolution photo here: http://tinyurl.com/linuxonplane

Observations from the linux crash on a plane photo:

1. 172.17.X.X private IP address range

2. FTP server IP address and transfer of system log tarball to the FTP server…user is “xxxxx” — imagine what the password might be…

Some reasonable concerns:

1. Tilting up the headrest PC and peeking behind it I saw CAT-5 cable. With a small tool or hands, and big cajones, an attacker *could possibly* unplug that cable and attach it to a laptop and hop onto the entertainment network. In addition, with some imagination and the right tools, an attacker could feasibly take over some or all aspects of the headrest PCs, including perhaps the sniffing of credit cards used by patrons, or even adding some specialized content…

2. This aircraft did not have on-board wireless Internet access, but I suspect that some airlines offering this service could have network crossover connectivity to different subnets, or perhaps only relying on VLANs for separation.

In the end, we can only hope that of the several networks likely running on a modern passenger jet, that true air-gapping is taking place and these systems are in no way connected to critical on-board networks. Time will tell if this is indeed the case. In the meantime, keep an eye out for those Linux boxes crashing on planes!

On NPR’s ‘Fresh Air’ this week, Richard Clarke made some great points, in particular with the logic bomb scenarios of sneaking in code and untrustworthy hardware. While this is old news, it’s still a very real threat — recall that Chisco devices were discovered on US government networks and disclosed back in 2008.

With Richard Clarke’s story in mind, I think it’s worth re-visiting the “Chisco” problem. This article below is from three years ago, yet this same Chisco eBay seller mentioned, “Sincere Networking” is still up and running (ya gotta love that name, no?). Bear in mind this is just one of many Chisco eBay stores — that is, there are plenty of others moving all types of Chisco gear on eBay, including routers, firewalls, switches. We are way beyond WAN NIC interfaces folks.

Why can’t these get shut down?

Network World: “eBay ‘Chisco’ stores are selling fake Cisco products originating in China”

This counterfeit gear has already landed on plenty of networks, and it’s likely to continue. Just like the FBI’s conclusion on slide 10, I agree that a huge risk in this area stems from small ‘mom n’ pop’ subcontractor outfits that choose to purchase this gear on the cheap from eBay, and then charge-back their own clients for the list price on CCO. Of course, that dirty network engineer in your organization could do a swap-out with Chisco gear during your next change management window — and in these economic times perhaps merely to re-sell the valuable real card rather than backdoor the organization’s network.

That said, recent security conference presentations, such as CanSecWest’s “Can you still trust your network card” should be at the forefront of the discussion when this Chisco topic comes up.

I know this is a dirty subject. It’s so dirty that very few folks even want to discuss it. It’s a nightmare. But like it or not, it’s going to be up to you to make sure that your gear is legitimate, especially if you’re on a US government network as according to the FBI’s presentation on slide 40, “Cisco’s Brand Protection does NOT coordinate with Cisco’s Government Sales”

Here’s a few links to hopefully get you started on the right path.

Comments with additional resources are most welcome.

Awhile back I blogged on VOIPSA about medical devices using VoIP. This is a follow-up to that post, and is a bit more tangible in that these devices are showing up on the auction sites.

I typically check eBay weekly for medical devices showing up, with an eye for anything with a network interface.

Bluetooth-enabled devices abound, but the (mis-perception) that an attacker must be physically close decreases popular interest from a security testing perspective. In contrast, it’s a box “on the wire” that enables an attacker in say, Palau, to to reach out and provide what I’d call a “negative home medical monitoring experience.”

So what’s on eBay?

Here’s a ViTel (now owned by Bosch) device and blood pressure monitor on eBay that’s a few years old, but has the ability “…to communicate via standard telephone line, broadband, or cellular and does not interfere with existing telephone service.”

ViTel Net Turtle 400 & A&D UA-767PC Blood Pres. Monitor
eBay Link: http://tinyurl.com/yytwgma

Suggested for discussion:

1. Should vendors of these devices be concerned about their sale on site like eBay? Why or why not?

2. Are there any available business services that monitor the after-market sale of these devices?

3. Would/should vendors care about re-acquiring these devices?

4. How interesting / valuable would it be to conduct a security analysis on this device, report the findings to CERT, and publish at DefCon or BlackHat?

5. Does a diagram like the one below concern anyone?

Most of us are familiar with the information disclosure risks associated with devices like phones and ATAs on the Internet, and this has been mentioned in presentations like Endler/Collier at BlackHat in 2006. However, the recent emergence of Shodan significantly raises the exposure of these devices, especially embedded systems.

Shodan bills itself as a “Computer Search Engine” and some folks have raised questions about the impact, ethics, etc. So far, Shodan has remained under-the-radar, but I expect we’ll see more coverage and questioning of what value-add this service provides to security efforts.

A few simple searches of Shodan will provide the reader more insight of the capabilities of this service. Bear in mind that searches can get much more specific. Also, Shodan is growing, and it’s worth re-visiting the site to gain better perspective of updates.

Example searches:

1. VOIP — http://shodan.surtri.com/?q=voip
2. Nortel — http://shodan.surtri.com/?q=nortel
3. Mitel — http://shodan.surtri.com/?q=mitel
4. .mil — http://shodan.surtri.com/?q=.mil
5. SCADA — http://shodan.surtri.com/?q=scada

Typically I don’t follow the deluge of Windows rootkits available because the sheer number and variety make diligently understanding all of them more than fairly daunting. After all, given limited resources, one must choose their battles and specialties in the security field.

That said, occasionally a Windows rootkit surfaces that is so mean, nasty and downright cool, that it becomes a must-know. Such is the case with the newest release of Stoned Bootkit. Be sure to go to their site and check it out, along with the paper, but here are a few highlights:

Understanding the threats that Windows rootkits like this pose to VoIP security, especially on end users, is key.

With all the hubbub surrounding medical insurance reform, town hall meetings, and other distractions events it’s worthwhile looking at some of the technical medical devices coming into the marketplace to be placed in patients’ homes, connected to their broadband internet connection.

Of several products in the patient home monitoring space, the Intel Health Guide PHS 6000 is perhaps one of the better positioned to garner marketshare because of several factors: including the size of Intel, on-going placement of the PHS 6000 in settings, and FDA approval in July, 2008.

Of the many PHS 6000 features, the device also supports two-way video conferencing between patient and caregiver. As this communication takes place over the broadband connection, it’s reasonable to assume that some sort of VoIP software is in place. Of course, details at this point are thin, and it’s even hard to get a real handle on what the PHS 6000 operating system really is, with some reports indicating Microsoft Windows XP, and others indicating a embedded Linux derivative. Still, it looks like there is a VoIP stack, and it’s likely SIP-based.

Clearly, the importance of the security of devices like the Intel PHS 6000 is apparent. And with the growing interest and funding towards cost-reduction and tele-health, we can expect to see these types of devices deployed widely. But what of the security posture? Sure, there’s boasting of encryption for the connection, but features like SSL mean little in the face of real attacks and vulnerabilities — think SSL encryption downgrade attacks, spoofing and man-in-the-middle vectors to start.

To get the word out, I’ve started a LinkedIn group called MedSec to get together like-minded, talented security people with an interest in medical device security. I’ve been chumming the waters with this approach in the hopes that the right people with the right connections conduct proper security evaluations of this PHS 6000 device, and it’s back-end management system as well. Of course, if approached, I’m interested in some hand’s on time too

Over time, it’s easy to become a bit out of touch with security tools. With new tools arriving on the scene daily, and updates to established tools occurring frequently, the deluge of information can be overwhelming; not to mention all of the other security fodder we process.

That said, I find it encouraging to revisit some of the really established tools to see what changes and improvements are in place. Nmap is without a doubt the classic security tool in every aspect, from quality, to longevity, to street credibility. Even Hollywood has clue when it comes to Nmap, as evidenced in Matrix, Bourne, and Die Hard films with Nmap showing up on someone’s computer screen!

One of my favorite Nmap features is the OS Identification and Application Fingerprinting capabilities. In part, this type of identification relies on the Nmap community scanning known devices and submitting signatures to be added to the Nmap databases (service probes, OS, etc.).

As of 21 July, 2009, the Nmap OS database has the following VoIP device Fingerprints:

Fingerprint Alcatel 4035 VoIP phone
Fingerprint Sirio by Alice VoIP phone
Fingerprint AudioCodes Mediant 1000 VoIP gateway
Fingerprint Audiocodes MP-114 or MP-118 VoIP gateway
Fingerprint Avaya G350 Media Gateway (VoIP gateway)
Fingerprint Avaya Office IP403 VoIP gateway
Fingerprint Avaya Office IP500 VoIP gateway
Fingerprint Aastra 480i GT or 9133i IP phone
Fingerprint Inter-tel 8662 VoIP phone
Fingerprint Comtrend CT-800 VoIP gateway
Fingerprint D-Link DVG-4022S VoIP gateway
Fingerprint Grandstream HandyTone HT-488 analog VoIP adapter
Fingerprint Grandstream BudgeTone 100 VoIP phone
Fingerprint Grandstream BudgeTone 100 VoIP phone
Fingerprint Grandstream GXP2000 VoIP phone
Fingerprint Grandstream GXP2020 VoIP phone
Fingerprint Thomson ST 2020 or 2030 VoIP phone
Fingerprint Interbell IB-305 VoIP phone
Fingerprint Linksys PAP2T VoIP router
Fingerprint Linksys SPA901 or SPA921 SIP VoIP phone
Fingerprint Linksys SPA942, SPA962, or SPA9000 VoIP phone; SPA3102 VoIP gateway; or Sipura SPA-2100 or SPA-2101 VoIP adapter
Fingerprint Mitel 3300 CXi VoIP PBX
Fingerprint Netcomm V300 VoIP gateway
Fingerprint Neuf Box Trio3D DSL modem/router/VoIP/TV
Fingerprint Nortel CS1000M VoIP PBX or Xerox Phaser 8560DT printer
Fingerprint Patton SmartNode 4960 VoIP gateway (SmartWare 4.2)
Fingerprint Perfectone IP-301 VoIP phone
Fingerprint Planet VIP-154T VoIP phone (MicroC/OS-II)
Fingerprint Polycom SoundPoint IP 301 VoIP phone
Fingerprint Polycom SoundPoint IP 301 VoIP phone
Fingerprint Polycom SoundPoint IP 430 VoIP phone
Fingerprint PORTech GSM VoIP gateway
Fingerprint PORTech MV-374 GSM-SIP VoIP gateway
Fingerprint Samsung OfficeServ 7200 VoIP gateway
Fingerprint ShoreTel ShoreGear-T1 VoIP switch
Fingerprint Siemens HiPath optiPoint 400 VoIP phone
Fingerprint Sipura SPA-1001 or SPA-3000 VoIP adapter
Fingerprint Sipura SPA-3000 VoIP adapter
Fingerprint Thomson Symbio VoIP phone
Fingerprint Vegastream Vega 400 VoIP Gateway

Also, it’s well worth taking a look at the VoIP devices identified in the Nmap Service Probes database as services that identify a VoIP device do not necessarily mean that the VoIP device has a fingerprint. In other words, there are VoIP devices in the Service Probes database that are not in the OS Fingerprint database, so look carefully!

For even more coolness, be sure to check out the NSE.

Wrapping-up, I’ve nothing less than mad props for Fyodor and all of the other folks who’ve contributed to this fantastic tool. Nmap was one of the first tools I used 10 years ago when first cutting my teeth in security, and remarkably, is a tool that I continue to use almost daily.